New Information

Several months after the publication of the hardcover copy of this book, I began a new round of research encompassing the FBI and air traffic controllers from Washington to Cleveland when the Federal Aviation Administration finally fulfilled Freedom of Information Act requests relevant to 9/11. This new information revealed previously unknown aspects of the air events of September 11th, demonstrating the extent of the misinformation and confusion with which leaders had to contend.  It also confirmed the historic shoot-down orders issued to the DC Air National Guard, clarified the timing of the Hutchison flight, and established the origin of some of the erroneous testimony presented to the 9/11 Commission by those in the White House Presidential Emergency Operations Center. 

 At 10:08 a.m. on September 11th, five minutes after Cleveland Center controllers lost radar contact with United 93 over Pennsylvania, a supervisor entered a revised flight plan for the flight into the FAA Computer system.   The flight plan listed a destination of Washington National Airport, and created coast track (often incorrectly referred to as a “ghost track”) of United 93 on the Traffic Situational Displays (TSDs) at air traffic control facilities.  A coast track differs from a radar track in that it is not supported by radar returns but rather by a computer-generated, projected course for the flight. Although this track did not appear on controller radar screens, its presence on their TSDs allowed Washington controllers to monitor the flights progression toward Washington.  Had the flight not crashed, and had it been flying too low to be picked up by radar, this would have likely been the only means to forecast its flight path into the capital. 

 A controller in Washington, unaware that the flight had crashed, was calling position reports for the coast track of United 93 to the White House (where shoot-down orders were issued to the DCANG and forwarded to pilot Billy Hutchison), as well as the FBI at the Pentagon (where firefighters were evacuated and the firefight suspended in anticipation of a second impact). 

 Radio data indicates that Hutchison’s flight did not depart from Andrews to intercept the hijacked airliner until just after 10:35.  This information does not change the historic nature of the orders he received, or that he took off low on fuel to intercept the hijacked airliner, or that he was willing to ram into the airliner to prevent it from striking Washington.  It does, however, indicate that he could not have seen United 93, which had already crashed, on his radar. 

 It is impossible to prove whether Hutchison could have been in position to take out United 93.  It depends upon variables that did not happen or that do not know, such as what time would the flight have arrived over Washington had the passenger revolt continued and the hijackers continued their erratic flying toward Washington, and if they had continued toward Washington, what course would they have flown (not all of the hijacked airliners flew direct courses to their targets)?  Having researched these events for three years, I believe that no airliner could have successfully penetrated Washington’s airspace after approximately 10:15 a.m. on September 11th, 2001.

 The events of 9/11 were a complex series of decisions, communications and actions based on both real and perceived information.  The attacks crossed many command and control boundaries, and given the large numbers of people and organizations involved, the confusion created by the reporting of this coast track represents just one more contributor to the “fog of war” leaders faced when responding to events of this tragic day.

-Lynn Spencer